Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors


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SUPPLY CHAINS AND PARTNERSHIPS

Figure 2 shows the results of a constrained model of our theoretical framework, where the nonsignificant paths of the estimated model i. Anderson and Gerbing recommend this procedure and suggest a chi-square difference test CDT for nested models to test the null hypothesis i. The model presented in Figure 2 turned out to provide the best fit of the observed correlations between the concepts. It shows that several paths are significant and that the overall model fit is good. Furthermore, the analysis of the total effects i. Figure 3 shows the results of the structural equation model for the buyer sample.

The overall goodness of fit indices could not be calculated in the theoretical model because the model did not converge after the iterations. We then tested a similar alternative model in which the composite performance variable was replaced by the two measures of performance growth rate and profitability. As can be seen from the results of the alternative model in figure 3 , several paths are significant and the overall model fit is good.

In order to provide greater confidence of the explanatory strength of the model in Figure 3 , we tested our model against an alternative constrained model not significant paths set to zero. After a CDT, the model presented in Figure 3 revealed to be more parsimonious model than the alternative constrained model.

Table 1 provides an overview of the tests of the hypotheses. It clearly shows, that the information that firms obtain from the network affects the long-term buyer-supplier relationship. The network encourages firms to invest in assets specifically meant for transactions with a counterpart H1. In the supplier sample, we found that the network fosters trust, whereas in the buyers' sample the effect of network information on trust is negative, contrary to our hypothesis H2 , and what has been posited in previous research.

Furthermore, as hypothesized, the network exerts an indirect positive effect on joint action and has a direct positive impact on flexibility H3 and H4. Trust indirectly influences joint action and directly impacts flexibility in a positive way, as hypothesized H5 and H6. As expected, transaction-specific investment offers coordination and further integration of activities and resources, which promotes joint problem solving and joint planning i. The effect of flexibility was supported in the supplier sample. In contrast, there was no significant effect of flexibility on joint action in the buyer sample H8.

In the supplier sample, there was a surprising negative effect of joint action on performance, while in the buyer sample, we found that joint action positively influences the profitability of the respondent firms H9. Finally, for flexibility we found that it was negatively related in the supplier sample and positively related to performance in the buyer sample H Recently, scholars have suggested that to understand fully the nature of a dyadic relationship, greater attention must be paid to the network context.

In this study we drew on emerging perspectives on interfirm governance and networks to develop a theoretical framework. In the estimated models, we found several positive impacts of the information obtained from the business network on the dimensions of a long-term buyer-supplier relationship, such as transaction specific investments, trust and the norm of flexibility. Also, an indirect effect of the network was found on joint action.

Regarding performance, a collaborative, long-term relationship appears to lead to success both operational and financial. The result of this research supports our rationale that the business network compensates for the information asymmetry assumed in transaction cost economics. The monitoring and enforcement of an agreement allows firms to move from market-based exchanges to collaborative relationships without additional transaction costs or loss of performance.

A supplier or distributor accesses information that reduces the information asymmetry and allows for efficient collaboration. The lack of information precludes the ability of a firm to foresee the future actions of a counterpart. Therefore, this study provides empirical evidence to conclude that business network information enables trust, transaction specific investments and collaboration, and, ultimately, performance.

Although there are several similarities in our findings, buyers and suppliers clearly show different patterns in their approach to achieving performance. If we look at the positive signs in our equation models we can conclude that, whereas the most successful buyers tend to focus on the "hard", tangible approach business network information, via transaction specific investments and joint action to financial performance, see Figure 4 , the most successful suppliers tend to focus on the "soft" elements - business network information to foster trust and via norms of flexibility to tangible financial and intangible perceived satisfaction performance see Figure 5.

High performing buyers use network information to foster transaction-specific investments. Buyers then engage in joint planning and joint problem solving to safeguard these investments. These large companies are clearly not interested in the day-to-day operation of the supplier. If buyers are active in assessing information from the network, it is primarily because they want to monitor the counterpart's willingness to develop or adapt its offerings to their requirements.

Literature on purchasing management emphasizes that few suppliers provide the items critical to the success of the buyer's offerings. Failure in even one of these relationships can be critical to a firm's operation. Considering the situation that buyers have not many alternatives to get the specific potted plants, buyers who follow the 'hard' approach are more likely to achieve success.

Conversely, Figure 5 shows the successful suppliers' 'soft' approach. The network plays a central role here, because the suppliers use the information obtained in the network to build-up trust in the relationship with the much larger buyer company. Suppliers that take these 'soft' elements into account are likely to be successful in a buyer-supplier relationship. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research. The analysis presented in this paper should be evaluated in the light of some limitations, which lead to suggestions for further research. Firstly, for hypotheses-testing purposes, we decided to test our framework in a particular and homogeneous context: the Dutch potted plant and flower industry.

Restricting the context served the dual purpose of controlling for extraneous sources of variation and developing grounded measures.

Therefore, caution should be used in extrapolating our results to other contexts. Secondly, the network effects focused on the information that firms obtain from the business network. We encourage future research to further explore network effect in terms of gaining control and resources or finding opportunities. Thirdly, the issue of contracts or other formal documentation was not considered in the theoretical framework because the companies in our sample opt for private orders 1 , we suggest that the role of contracts be considered in another business context in terms of contract law, letter of intent or other form of document.

Fourthly, our results regarding the different performance strategies of buyers and suppliers show that there is a perceived power balance when dealing in fixed line transactions. Future studies should carefully consider the concept of power balance and dependency when using our framework in other industries.

Finally, our study used a cross-sectional design, thus preventing the investigation of the dynamic effects. However, proof of causal relationships requires a longitudinal research design, further work along this line is therefore encouraged. The implications of our study are best viewed within the context of the trend toward close, long-term relationships. Quite often the social capital that is inherent to such close relationships is considered a desirable goal. We therefore started our article by asking ourselves: Is there any difference between the relationship strategy employed by suppliers and buyers?

In other words: should purchasing managers concentrate on the social elements associated with the relationship or is it better for sales managers to concentrate on those elements?

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Based on our results, we advise managers to be very cautious is finding the optimal balance between human, social and structural resources. The basic postulate in our work is that a firm may coordinate relationships with a counterpart by means of collaboration and, especially suppliers, by trust and the norm of flexibility; and especially buyers, by transaction-specific investments. However, this is not always desirable. In our focal industry, buyers and suppliers have looked for channels to reduce price and the unpredictability of volume and moreover to reduce bottlenecks in delivery.

Successful buyer and supplier companies have clearly opted for different strategies in this situation.

Join the Discussion

Whereas the 'hard' tangible approach provided the best results for buyers, it was the 'soft' intangible approach that turned out to be the best approach for the suppliers, depending on the differences in their business contexts. So, although we can point at a number of advantages for firms to set up close relationships with counterparts, building relationships and networks involves investment of time and resources that might outweigh the benefits.

For instance, given the costs associated with the shift away from spot-market exchange e. Managers may use these findings to check the adequacy of their business networks and their approach to relationship marketing. At the very least, our study should serve as a cautionary example about the conditions that evoke the need to craft and manage collaborative, long-term relationships and networks.

In order to control, we added in the questionnaire a question concerning the use of contracts. Only two suppliers of the have legally enforced a contract over the past 5 years in a court of law. This confirmed that the studied relationship has a relational basis and opt for private order as suggested in Williamson Anderson, J.

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The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage.


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Stock grants motivate key executives to stay with the company until the restrictions lapse, typically within three or four years, and they can cash in their shares. These grants create a strong incentive for CEOs and other top managers to play it safe, protect existing value, and avoid getting fired. In an effort to deflect the criticism that restricted stock plans are a giveaway, many companies offer performance shares that require not only that the executive remain on the payroll but also that the company achieve predetermined performance goals tied to EPS growth, revenue targets, or return-on-capital-employed thresholds.

Companies need to balance the benefits of requiring senior executives to hold continuing ownership stakes and the resulting restrictions on their liquidity and diversification. Companies seeking to better align the interests of executives and shareholders need to find a proper balance between the benefits of requiring senior executives to have meaningful and continuing ownership stakes and the resulting restrictions on their liquidity and diversification. Without equity-based incentives, executives may become excessively risk averse to avoid failure and possible dismissal.

If they own too much equity, however, they may also eschew risk to preserve the value of their largely undiversified portfolios. Better disclosure not only offers an antidote to short-term earnings obsession but also serves to lessen investor uncertainty and so potentially reduce the cost of capital and increase the share price. This statement:. The corporate performance statement provides a way to estimate both things by separating realized cash flows from forward-looking accruals. The first part of this statement tracks only operating cash flows.

It does not replace the traditional cash flow statement because it excludes cash flows from financing activities—new issues of stocks, stock buybacks, new borrowing, repayment of previous borrowing, and interest payments. The second part of the statement presents revenue and expense accruals, which estimate future cash receipts and payments triggered by current sales and purchase transactions.

Management estimates three scenarios—most likely, optimistic, and pessimistic—for accruals of varying levels of uncertainty characterized by long cash-conversion cycles and wide ranges of plausible outcomes. Could such specific disclosure prove too costly? The reality is that executives in well-managed companies already use the type of information contained in a corporate performance statement. Indeed, the absence of such information should cause shareholders to question whether management has a comprehensive grasp of the business and whether the board is properly exercising its oversight responsibility.

In the present unforgiving climate for accounting shenanigans, value-driven companies have an unprecedented opportunity to create value simply by improving the form and content of corporate reports. The crucial question, of course, is whether following these ten principles serves the long-term interests of shareholders. For most companies, the answer is a resounding yes.

Just eliminating the practice of delaying or forgoing value-creating investments to meet quarterly earnings targets can make a significant difference. Further, exiting the earnings-management game of accelerating revenues into the current period and deferring expenses to future periods reduces the risk that, over time, a company will be unable to meet market expectations and trigger a meltdown in its stock.

For most organizations, value-creating growth is the strategic challenge, and to succeed, companies must be good at developing new, potentially disruptive businesses. If companies meet those expectations, shareholders will earn only a normal return. So the only reasonable way to deliver superior long-term returns is to focus on new business opportunities. Value-creating growth is the strategic challenge, and to succeed, companies must be good at developing new, potentially disruptive businesses.

Companies focused on short-term performance measures are doomed to fail in delivering on a value-creating growth strategy because they are forced to concentrate on existing businesses rather than on developing new ones for the longer term. When managers spend too much time on core businesses, they end up with no new opportunities in the pipeline. And when they get into trouble—as they inevitably do—they have little choice but to try to pull a rabbit out of the hat.

With a little adaptation, it plays out like this:. Companies that take shareholder value seriously avoid this self-reinforcing pattern of behavior. They are, therefore, more likely to become first movers in a market and erect formidable barriers to entry through scale or learning economies, positive network effects, or reputational advantages.

Their management teams are forward-looking and sensitive to strategic opportunities. Over time, they get better than their competitors at seizing opportunities to achieve competitive advantage. Although applying the ten principles will improve long-term prospects for many companies, a few will still experience problems if investors remain fixated on near-term earnings, because in certain situations a weak stock price can actually affect operating performance. The risk is particularly acute for companies such as high-tech start-ups, which depend heavily on a healthy stock price to finance growth and send positive signals to employees, customers, and suppliers.

As a consequence, management may have to defer or scrap its value-creating growth plans. Then, as investors become aware of the situation, the stock price continues to slide, possibly leading to a takeover at a fire-sale price or to bankruptcy. Severely capital-constrained companies can also be vulnerable, especially if labor markets are tight, customers are few, or suppliers are particularly powerful.

A low share price means that these organizations cannot offer credible prospects of large stock-option or restricted-stock gains, which makes it difficult to attract and retain the talent whose knowledge, ideas, and skills have increasingly become a dominant source of value. Suppliers and distributors may also react by offering less favorable contractual terms, or, if they sense an unacceptable probability of financial distress, they may simply refuse to do business with the company. Clearly, if a company is vulnerable in these respects, then responsible managers cannot afford to ignore market pressures for short-term performance, and adoption of the ten principles needs to be somewhat tempered.

But the reality is that these extreme conditions do not apply to most established, publicly traded companies. Few rely on equity issues to finance growth. Most generate enough cash to pay their top employees well without resorting to equity incentives. Most also have a large universe of customers and suppliers to deal with, and there are plenty of banks after their business.

The sooner you make your firm a level 10 company, the more you and your shareholders stand to gain. And what better moment than now for institutional investors to act on behalf of the shareholders and beneficiaries they represent and insist that long-term shareholder value become the governing principle for all the companies in their portfolios? Corporate communications. Alfred Rappaport. September Issue Explore the Archive.

Executive Summary Reprint: RC Executives have developed tunnel vision in their pursuit of shareholder value, focusing on short-term performance at the expense of investing in long-term growth.

How To Manage Strategic Suppliers

The Idea in Brief Many firms sacrifice sustained growth for short-term financial gain. The Idea in Practice Rappaport recommends these additional practices to create long-term growth for your company: Make strategic decisions that maximize expected future value—even at the expense of lower near-term earnings. Which have limited potential and therefore should be restructured or divested? What mix of investments across operating units should produce the most long-term value? Carry assets only if they maximize the long-term value of your firm.

Focus on activities that contribute most to long-term value, such as research and strategic hiring. Outsource lower value activities such as manufacturing. Dell invests extensively in marketing and telephone sales while minimizing its investments in distribution, manufacturing, and inventory-carrying facilities. Return excess cash to shareholders when there are no value-creating opportunities in which to invest. Disburse excess cash reserves to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks.

Reward senior executives for delivering superior long-term returns. Standard stock options diminish long-term motivation, since many executives cash out early. Instead, use. Reward operating-unit executives for adding superior multiyear value. Instead of linking bonuses to budgets a practice that induces managers to lowball performance possibilities , develop metrics that capture the shareholder value created by the operating unit. And extend the performance evaluation period to at least a rolling three-year cycle.

Reward middle managers and frontline employees for delivering superior performance on key value drivers they influence directly. Focus on three to five leading value-based metrics, such as time to market for new product launches, employee turnover, customer retention, and timely opening of new stores.

Provide investors with value-relevant information. Counter short-term earnings obsession and investor uncertainty by improving the form and content of financial reports. If both firms perceive that the relationship is creating value, they can make additional efforts and investments to maintain the relationship within a virtuous cycle Ambrose et al.

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For instance, the higher the buyer's intrinsic value, the higher the probability is that the supplier will make every effort to capture and use these benefits, which can avoid the use that its competitors might make. This study therefore corroborates the arguments advocated by Lavie , who proposed an extension of the Resource-Based View, stating that the value created by a firm comes not only from its own resources, but also from the resources belonging to its partners and from resources derived from its alliance networks.

We hereby extend this statement further by adding the resources obtained from non-collaborative, or purely transactional relationships to the group of sources of value creation. The objective of this paper was to investigate the issue of value creation and capture through an empirical test of a model that separates the concept of relationship value according to its sources: the individual parties intrinsic value and the relationship itself relational value. Briefly, this objective summarizes the main theoretical contributions of this paper. Firstly, it separates value creation from value capture, contrary to the general approach that tends to bunch them together, for which scales were developed.

Secondly, it divides the relationship value into two types that can, in turn, be split into three components according to the sources of value creation both the buyer's and the supplier's intrinsic value, and relational value. Thirdly, the study identifies the relations between these components, as well as the spectrum of the capture of this value within the dyad. The study approaches the data collection by looking at dyads, which is in itself a relevant contribution since most literature on the subject tends to prioritize just the one side of the relationship.

The results show that both the buyer's and the supplier's intrinsic value are directly related to relational value creation, and that the greater the relational value creation, the greater is the value captured by each party. The test also demonstrates that the buyer's intrinsic value is captured by the supplier, who benefits from this capture in other relationships along the value chain.

Some managerial contributions also emerge. Firstly, purchasing professionals must be aware of their organization's intrinsic value, and better communicate these attributes. By doing so, suppliers are expected to engage in actions aimed at capturing this value, and these actions can then lead to a superior relational value creation, which in turn benefits the buyer as well. Secondly, sales professionals must identify opportunities for their own development, considering the additional benefits derived from each relationship in which the supplier company is engaged. In theory, one firm could benefit exclusively from the portfolio of its relationships, as all the value it generates could be derived from relationship value spillovers, regardless of the degree of collaboration.

However, if both firms engage in more collaborative relationships, this fact stimulates the sharing of resources and knowledge between them in order to increase mutual value creation and capture. If each party succeeds in capturing more intrinsic and relational value from its relationships, it then benefits from better performance and competitiveness.

With regard to the limitations of this study, one should highlight the profile of the sample. On average, respondents at buying firms are less strategically driven than those working for suppliers. This operational perspective tends to focus more on expenditure rather than on value earnings, whereas a more strategic view leads to a greater perception of attributes and benefits. Other limitations can, however, be seen as opportunities for further research. Firstly, since the study shows a more prominent value capture by suppliers, it would be useful to have a better understanding of which intrinsic characteristics associated with buyers might help enhance value creation, and which mechanisms are used by suppliers to improve their competitive advantage in relation to other customers.

Such research could also contribute to the examination of value creation in networks of relationships, expanding the dyadic view. Secondly, the data collection was based on the Brazilian chemical industry, which means that the results were specific to this sector. Extending the survey to other industries and other countries could be beneficial to the validity and reliability of the model. Industries like cosmetics, foodstuffs and telecommunications have certain demand specificities and a high diversity of buyers and suppliers that would help to test the framework in different scenarios, so as to generalize the conclusions.

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Do not manage earnings or provide earnings guidance.

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Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors
Creation of Value to Buyers, Suppliers and Investors

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