U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH


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See all condition definitions - opens in a new window or tab. This program was aimed at sustaining a U. In the mids, the NSC under the Reagan administration once again commissioned a stockpile requirements study that declared most of the stockpile inventories unnecessary. This determination was in direct conflict with the prevailing thinking of Congress and several federal agencies, and in December of , Congress directed DoD to take over the NDS, including requirements assessments.

The civilian agencies retained a role only on the advisory committees. These events drove changes in the methodology for requirements assessments, an effort led by the Institute for Defense Analyses IDA. While the methodology for modeling requirements was improved, the assumptions for the modeling in the late s remained limited. These assumptions, based on the Stockpiling Act, included a 3-year war scenario and considered that apart from U. S materials suppliers, only Canadian and Mexican suppliers could be considered reliable.

Nonetheless, IDA made modeling the requirements more quantitative by utilizing econometrics to determine supply and demand for NDS materials. This enabled a range of policy options for NDS to be explored and was the framework for evaluating stockpile requirements as DoD planning guidance began to change in , when the Cold War ended and foreign sources of materials were deemed more reliable. According to the annual NDS reports, the stockpile goals and holdings peaked in , when the NDS contained 91 line items in 62 materials classifications.

The stockpile had been deficient since before in all but one of the 40 materials identified. A year previously, a report from the DoD Inspector General IG concluded that the process for determining the types, quantities, and qualities of materials to be acquired and retained in the stockpile needed improvement DoD, The audit also found that improvements were.

Specifically, the IG recommended that DoD do three things:. Base future stockpile goals on a more realistic force level; such as the programmed force; use domestic production capacity from new and reopened facilities; and consider foreign production sources other than Canada and Mexico during a crisis. As provided for in Section 10 a of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, establish and institutionalize an interagency advisory committee in coordination with the Departments of Commerce, Interior, and State, to be composed of government experts and to provide information on the civilian and industrial tiers that affect the materials requirements generation process and to assist in the computation of requirements for materials that cannot be quantitatively modeled.

Include in the charter of the interagency committee specific responsibilities to assimilate the information necessary to formulate stockpile requirements and to prioritize the stockpile actions regarding those requirements. One of the most restrictive aspects of the methodology for setting NDS requirements and goals setting was the statutory requirement that the criteria include the ability to sustain a global conventional war lasting at least 3 years and involving total mobilization of the economy.

DoD also noted that in addition to Canada and Mexico, countries in the Caribbean basin would be included as reliable sources in the process to define the requirements. Concomitant with these developments came the fall of the Berlin Wall and the recognition that U. The new approach concentrated on the need to address regional conflicts while maintaining a minimal force and preserving a hedge capacity to rebuild defenses for global warfare in the event of a resurgent superpower rivalry.

A new defense strategy was outlined in the National Military Strategy NMS , 1 and with changes in the geopolitical climate came a significant reevaluation of the reliability of foreign sources of materials beyond just the countries in the Caribbean basin. With the changing defense posture came a moratorium on stockpile purchases in as threat scenarios and country reliability estimates changed—and as DoD budgets were cut.

These changes significantly reshaped policy toward the NDS. Included in the. Accessed June It was not to be used for economic or budgetary purposes. The law further required that the AMP submission to Congress detail the maximum quantity of each commodity to be bought or sold in the fiscal year and that the AMP also report on the projected domestic or foreign economic effects of such transactions.

Since , when the main sales program began, Congress has earmarked part of the funds for specific revenue goals and for particular military programs. Since then, the essential framework for modeling of stockpile requirements has remained largely unchanged see Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the models used today. With large reductions in the types and quantities of materials, the DNSC has significantly reduced the number of facilities for warehousing materials.

Under the current plan, by the end of FY, the stockpile will have three consolidated storage locations and a total workforce of 65 DoD, The specific materials and quantities to be held in the NDS must be authorized by the President. The law requires the President to determine the quality and quantity of each strategic and critical material to be acquired, and the form in which it will be acquired. The President must inform Congress in writing of any proposed changes to stockpile quantities 45 days before making the change.

The President may also authorize the rotation or upgrading of the materials held in the stockpile, to assure that they are suitable for use in an emergency. Similarly, the President may authorize the release or disposition of materials in the stockpile at any time, provided the material release is needed for the national defense in time of declared war or during a national emergency. Figure shows that since there have been no acquisitions of materials or upgrades to the materials already in the NDS. Releases from the stockpile have been very limited, as shown in Box The President may also authorize the disposal of materials in the stockpile that are deemed to be in excess of requirements or at risk from deterioration.

Data taken from DNSC annual materials reports. Since , changes in defense requirements and supply assumptions have greatly reduced the stockpile requirements, and most of its content has been deemed to be in excess. As mentioned above, Congress instructed DoD to sell off this excess. Such a sale requires specific enabling legislation from Congress. This legislation is based on the AMP submitted to Congress by February 15 of each year, which lists the maximum quantity of each commodity to be bought or sold in the given fiscal year and recommends disposal plans consistent with stockpile requirements.

Senate and the U. House of Representatives. Following approval, the AMP becomes effective on the first day of the fiscal year. A revised AMP may be submitted during the fiscal year if significant changes are needed. It balances market impact concerns with the statutory requirement to protect the government against avoidable loss. The MIC must consult with representatives of the industries that produce, process, or consume the materials in the stockpile. Most of these revenues were used to offset other government expenditures, to fund the operating costs of the stockpile, or to reduce the deficit, as shown in Table The NDS was established to provide an insurance policy for the supply of critical materials in time of national emergency.

As shown in this section, materials have been released from the stockpile on only 10 occasions in the last 63 years. In recent years, the only NDS activity has been the selling of excess materials to provide funding for other government projects. Treasury a. The funding is used for a number of purposes:.


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Update materials specifications and upgrade existing stockpile materials to current specifications,. Contract for materials development and research to improve the quality and availability of materials in the stockpile and develop new materials for the stockpile,. Pay employees and other expenses of the stockpile program, including the cost of employees. As the size of the remaining stockpile decreases, so does the size of the staff, facilities, and expenses of its operation. It became clear to the committee early in the study that the question of the future of the stockpile was anything but new.

Some previous reports asked some important questions about the stockpile, considered alternative ways to assure materials supply, and recommended future actions. Some of those reports are summarized below, because although many of them are decades old, they deal with either the same issues as did this committee or similar ones. In it the GAO referred to an earlier report, U.

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Actions Needed to Cope with Commodity Shortages GAO, , where it had noted that shortages of basic commodities were causing serious economic, social, and political problems. Our complacency, however, has resulted in our failure to develop new material sources as fast as required by the economy. As a consequence, the United States is increasingly dependent upon foreign sources.

The NCMP report concluded that, on the basis of commodity summaries and projections, the gap between U. Provided that the stockpile was replenished , said the GAO report, stockpiled materials could be released and used as an alternative to imports as a source of supply, reducing import dependence. The GAO report concluded that because competition for a finite supply of nonrenewable resources was increasing and because producer boycotts and other restrictions were possible for some resources, the United States might no longer be able to count on importing the quantities of resources it needed.

Stockpile policy at the time did, however, assume that the United States would not be able to import from communist countries or from those involved in a conflict. The GAO believed this assumption ran contrary to the world resources outlook and that long-range planning would be necessary to deal with the increasing demand for resources.

Its report noted that the United States relied heavily on imports of some of the materials that had been authorized for selling off and questioned whether enough thought had been given to their future supply. If long-range planning had. Such planning was particularly important for materials that. It also recommended that the then stockpile manager, the Administrator of General Services, use these kinds of data to arrive at new national stockpile objectives. Finally, the GAO suggested that the Congress might want to consider broadening the strategic and critical materials stockpile concept to release material to meet short-term economic as well as national defense emergencies.

Any materials released for economic purposes, the GAO suggested, should be replenished so that all national defense requirements could be met.

U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH
U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH

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